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DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EDWARD J. ROLLINS:
POLITICS AS USUAL OR UNUSUAL POLITICS?
Rachel E. Berry*
Introduction
The right to vote occupies a unique and privileged
position in American jurisprudence. Voting rights are the
subject of almost half of the constitutional amendments
since the Civil War.' Federal laws passed pursuant to
those amendments provide strong, comprehensive rem-
edies for voting rights abuses.
2
Notwithstanding the arsenal of federal laws protect-
ing voting rights, the goal of full political participation
by racial and ethnic minorities continues to be frustrated.
Minorities continue to experience resistance at the polls,
the voting strength of racial and ethnic minorities con-
tinues to be the target of illegal racial gerrymanders, and
race continues to occupy a central, divisive position in
political rhetoric.
Perhaps the most enigmatic example of the current
problems plaguing minority political participation is the
so-called "Rollins affair." According to press reports, Ed-
*Washington and Lee University School of Law, Candi-
date for Juris Doctor, May 1996. 1 would like to thank Gisella
Erdody Berry, Louise Halper, and Daniel G. Schmedlen, Jr. for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
'U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVI (setting minimum age for
voting at eighteen); Id. amend. XXIV (eliminating poll taxes);
Id. amend. XXIII (establishing right of residents of District of
Columbia to participate in presidential elections); Id. amend.
XIX (establishing that right to vote shall not be denied on
account of sex); Id. amend. XVII (establishing requirements
for election of senators); Id. amend. XV (establishing that right
to vote shall not be denied on account of race). The Four-
teenth Amendment also serves as a primary protector of the
right to vote. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,559-60 (1964)
(establishing modem constitutional rule against vote dilution
under Equal Protection Clause: one person-one vote).
2See 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (a) (1988) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion on account of race in voting); Id. § 1971(b) (prohibiting
intimidation, threats and coercion for purpose of interfering
with right to vote); Id. § 1973(a) (proscribing voting qualifi-
cations or prerequisites which result in denial or abridgment
of right to vote on account of race); Id. § 1983 (establishing
liability for deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities
secured by Constitution and laws of United States); Id. § 1985
(prohibiting conspiracies to prevent by force, intimidation or
threats any person from voting).
3 Thomas B. Edsall & Malcolm Gladwell, Justice Said To
Be Probing New York Vote Suppression, WASH. PosT, Nov. 12,
1993, atA2; John Goldman, Probe Of Alleged Vote Suppression
Asked In New Jersey: Campaign Manager For Whitman Retracts
Statement That Ministers And Party Workers Were Paid To Not
Rally Behind Florio, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, at A17;
Katharine Seelye, What's Wrong With Suppressing An
Opponent's Vote? The Tactic Is Just How The Game Is Played,
Political Insiders Say. So Where Did Ed Rollins Go Astray?, PHILA.
ward J. Rollins, the campaign manager for New Jersey
gubernatorial candidate Christine Todd Whitman,
bragged to a group of reporters that he had used
$500,000 of Whitman's campaign money to "suppress"
black voting during the 1993 gubernatorial campaign.
Specifically, Rollins claimed that he had approached
black ministers known to be supporters of Whitman's
Democratic opponent, James Florio, and promised to
contribute to their favorite charities in exchange for the
ministers' promises not to rally the vote for Florio.
3
Rollins' statements spurred a federal investigation and a
federal lawsuit alleging voting rights abuses.4 Rollins sub-
sequently testified under oath,' however, that he had
lied to the Washington reporters, 6 and the investigation
and lawsuit were dropped.
7
The Rollins affair is enigmatic largely because fed-
eral law does not appear to provide a remedy for a
Rollins-type scheme" His alleged scheme was not quite
bribery - which includes paying someone to vote or
INQUIRER, Nov. 14, 1993, at D1 ("The idea was that, in ex-
change for the contributions, the ministers would forgo their
traditional pre-Election Day sermons to their largely Demo-
cratic parishioners, thereby dampening the Florio tumout.'.
4 Criminal Probe Of Jersey Campaign: Demos Also Sue
Governor-Elect Over Black Vote, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 13, 1993, at
A3 [hereinafter Criminal Probe] (reporting investigations by
U.S. Attorney in Newark); Thomas B. Edsall & Malcolm
Gladwell, Federal, State Probes Begin In NJ. Gubernatorial Vote,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 1993, at A2 (same).
I Thomas B. Rosenstiel, Rollins' Comeback Turns Into A
Nosedive, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1993, at Al (reporting that
Rollins spent over seven hours giving sworn deposition testi-
mony to lawyers from Democratic National Committee).
6 Rollins, Under Oath, Says He Lied About Racial Vote Tac-
tics, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 20, 1993, at A3 [hereinafter Rollins,
Under Oath].
7 Democrats Drop Suit To Overturn N.J. Election; Not Enough
Evidence Found, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 30, 1993, at 7
[hereinafter Democrats Drop Suit]; Rachel E. Stassen-Berger,
U.S., New Jersey Drop Probes Of Rollins Claims; No Vote Sup-
pression By Whitman Camp Found, WAsH. PosT, Jan. 13, 1994,
atA3.
8See Rorie Sherman, Political, Not Legal?, NAT'L LJ., Dec.
6,1993, at 6 (reporting consensus that Democratic Party's case
was based upon "strong politics" but "weak legal theory').
Michael W. McConnell, Professor of Law at the University of
Chicago Law School, reportedly stated that the Democrat's
suit did not have "much of a legal theory." Linda Bean, Plain-
tiffs Face High Hurdles, LEGAL TIEs, Nov. 29, 1993, at 2. Like-
wise, Laughlin McDonald, Director of the Atlanta-based Vot-
ing Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, de-
scribed the Democratic National Committee's arguments as
"artful," but noted that the DNC was "clearly stretching" fed-
eral voting rights law. Id.
not to vote, but does not include a scheme in which the
voter receives nothing of value.9 His alleged scheme also
did not compare to the strong-arm tactics that had
prompted Congress to pass current federal voting rights
laws.'0 Still, intuitively, observers sensed that a Rollins-
type scheme would have caused harm - and not sim-
ply offense - to minority voters.I
This article examines federal voting rights law and
the commitment the federal government has made to
ensuring the full political participation of minority vot-
ers. It attempts to answer the following question: is a
Rollins-type scheme "just politics as usual" or does such
a scheme represent the kind of threat to minority voting
rights that justifies federal intervention? Part I of this
article describes the background of the Rollins affair,
placing particular emphasis on the role played by the
political parties in shaping the dynamics of New Jersey
elections and voting rights litigation. Part II describes
the evolution of the "right to vote." The focus of Part II
will be on two important sources of federal voting rights
law: the Fifteenth Amendment 2 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.13 Part III argues that current voting rights
jurisprudence tends to describe voting in unduly indi-
vidual-oriented terms, and that such a narrow defini-
tion of the right to vote is inconsistent with early voting
rights jurisprudence and inadequate to protect the civic
function of voting in a democratic system. Part III also
argues that the current unwillingness to view a Rollins-
type scheme as vote "suppression" is a function of this
individual-oriented definition of voting. Part IIl concludes
by describing why, under a more civic-minded approach
to voting, a Rollins-type scheme violates the basic prin-
ciples of the right to vote.
9See Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money But By Virtue Won?
Vote Trafficking And The Voting Rights System, 80 VA. L. REv.
1455, 1463 (1994) (arguing that Rollins-type scheme is con-
ceptually different from bribery). Brenda Wright, Director of
the Voting Rights Project of the Washington Lawyers' Com-
mittee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, reportedly stated
that although federal and state laws prohibit vote-buying,
Rollins admitted "something else." See Bean, supra note 8.
10 See Bean, supra note 8 (reporting views of several com-
mentators who believe that federal voting rights law does not
cover Rollins-type scheme). Bernard Grofman, Professor of
Political Science at the University of California at Irvine re-
portedly stated that the Rollins affair had been"played up as a
civil-rights case, but that is wrong, and it's a mistake to tie it to
racial impact." Id. Laughlin McDonald reportedly stated that
the Democrats would have a hard time convincing the court
that the case merited an extension of existing federal laws pro-
hibiting the intimidation and coercion of voters, i.e., that the
behavior alleged was "equivalent" to the kind of threats en-
joined in other vote suppression cases. Id.
"1 See Karlan, supra note 9, at 1463-64 (noting that, intu-
itively, Ed Rollins' alleged scheme was more akin to vote sup-
pression than politics-as-usual, get-out-the-vote drives).
2 US. CoNsT. amend. XV.
PART I:THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE
ROLLINS AFFAIR
A. Rollins' Statements To The Press
On November 9, 1993, just a few days after Gover-
nor Christine Todd Whitman's narrow victory 14 over
Democratic incumbent James Florio, Whitman's cam-
paign manager, Edward J. Rollins, boasted to a group of
reporters in Washington that he had spent $500,000 of
Whitman's campaign money in a scheme designed to
reduce black voter turnout.' Specifically, Rollins stated:
[We] went into the black churches and basically said
to the ministers who had endorsed Florio, "Do you have
any special projects (charities)? We see you have already
endorsed Florio. That's fine. But don't get up on the
Sunday pulpit and say ... it's your moral obligation to
vote on Tuesday, to vote for Jim Florio."'
6
Rollins also claimed that members of the Whitman
campaign had approached Democratic poll workers and
offered them money to stay at home instead of helping
in the "get out the vote" drive:
[We asked,] "How much have they paid you to do
your normal duty. We'll match it, go home, sit and
watch television. And I think to a certain extent,
we suppressed their vote."7
B. The Political Uproar And Rollins' Denial
Rollins' statements prompted a political uproar. 8
Many believed that, if true, Rollins' scheme had crossed
a forbidden line; his alleged scheme was more than "poli-
1342 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1988). -
14 Whitman won 49% of the vote, as compared to Florio's
48%, a margin of approximately 27,000 votes out of 2.4 mil-
lion cast. Monte R.Young, Feds Probe Charge Of NJ. Vote Buyoff,
Democrats Moving To Overturn Election, NEWSDAY, Nov. 13,
1993, at 6.Whitman's victory over Florio was the second clos-
est in New Jersey history. Whitman's Liaison Denies Rollins
Claims, THE LEGAL INTELUGENCER, Nov. 23, 1993, at 39. The
closest New Jersey gubernatorial election was in 1981, when
James Florio lost to Republican Thomas Kean by one-twelfth
of one percent of the vote- Linda Bean, From Breakfast Chat
To Deposition, NJ. L.J., Nov. 22, 1993, at 32. With his defeat
in 1993, Florio earned the unfortunate distinction of having
lost the two closest gubernatorial elections in New Jersey his-
tory. See id.
" See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
16 Edsall & Gladwell, supra note 3.
171d.
18 Bean, supra note 14 (stating that Rollins' remarks pro-
voked a fury of protest); Rocco Cammarere, Unwelcome Politi-
cal Fanfare Greets Whitman, NJ. LAWYER, Nov. 22, 1993, at 25
(describing Rollins as at center of political fray); Ministers Sue
Rollins For Slander, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 29, 1993
[hereinafter Ministers Sue] (stating that Rollins' comments ig-
tics as usual" and was an attempt to suppress black vot-
ing. In short, it was the newest manifestation of illegal
racism in the area of voting rights, and required a swift
and forceful response. Elaine R. Jones, Director-Coun-
sel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund announced that
Rollins' scheme if true, would constitute "an outrageous,
race-based manipulation of the electoral system."1 9 Rev-
erend Jesse Jackson and other black leaders announced
their intention to file a slander suit against Rollins and
the New Jersey GOP: 'We marched too much, and bled
too profusely, and died too young to either sell our vote
or give it away."20 An editorial in The Washington Post
characterized the scheme as"reek[ing] of condescension
and racial put down."2 ' The editorialist found "troubling"
the possibility that money would be spent with the goal
of encouraging people not to exercise their right to vote?
Similarly, an editorial in The Recorder noted that:
Money paid to suppress voting disenfranchises vot-
ers. It makes our country less democratic. When vote
suppression is based on race, it is all the worse; those
who are already most alienated are driven further
from the democratic process. If democracy is to hold
any meaning at all to minority groups, we ought to
nited political firestorm); Strategist In Governor's Race Testifies
In N.J. Grand Jury, Mmw HERALD, Nov. 19,1993, atA23 [here-
inafter Strategist Testifies] (stating that Rollins' remarks started
political upheaval that reached from New Jersey to Washing-
ton).
19 Goldman, supra note 3.2'0 Seelye, supra note 3.
2 The Boasting Of Ed Rollins, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1993,
Op. Ed., at A24 [hereinafter Boasting].
2 Id.
21 David B. Oppenheirner, Voting Rights, Voting Wrongs, THE
RECORDER, Dec 12, 1993, Commentary, at 7.
24 Bean, supra note 14.
25 Id. "Street money" or"walking around money" refers to
money paid to individuals and groups during elections that is
supposed to help "get out the vote." See, ag., Russ Bleemer,
Rollins' Remarks Spark Bill Restricting "Street Money," NJ. LJ.,
Nov. 22, 1993, at 6 (describing function of street money in
campaigns); John Aloysius Farrell, et al., "Street Money" Litters
US. Politics, Spreading Cash on Election Day Is Alive And Well
And Quite Bipartisan, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 28, 1993, § 3, at 1
(reporting on widespread practice of distributing walking
around money during campaigns); Seelye, supra note 3 (de-
scribing history of street money in American politics).
26 Oppenheimer, supra note 23. The Democratic Party's
get-out-the-vote efforts in black neighborhoods can be crucial
in close elections in New Jersey, largely because black voters
tend to have extremely strong loyalty to the Democratic Party.
It is not unusual for over 78% of black voters nationwide to
self-identify with the Democratic Party. See Bob Drogin, GOP
Intensifies Its Effort To Appeal To Black Voters, L.A. TIMEs, Oct.
27, 1986, at 1 (reporting results of recent national Gallup sur-
vey). Democratic Party loyalty among black voters in North-
em New Jersey districts can be as high as 90%. Id. Political
strategists therefore recognize that black voters' party loyalty
scrupulously support minority participation in elec-
tions.2 3
The losing candidate, James Florio, called for an in-
vestigation, stating, "This sends a very distressing mes-
sage about democracy in this country."2 4 New Jersey As-
sembly Speaker Garabed Haytaian stated, "I am appalled
at the notion that anyone would even consider exerting
influence aimed at discouraging citizens of New Jersey
from voting," and called for a ban on "street money."2 5
The news media began investigating, and reports of
unusual election patterns poured in. The press reported
that Democratic campaign officials had been unable to
recruit the usual number of precinct workers for their
get-out-the-vote drive in African-American neighbor-
hoods.26 Reverend Keith Owens of the Kaighns Avenue
Baptist Church in Camden stated that several members
of the Black Ministers Council of New Jersey had re-
ceived offers from people identifying themselves as Re-
publicans and making offers consistent with Rollins'
description of the campaign tactics.2 7 Daniel Todd,
Whitman's brother, noted that the election turnout in
Democratic voting districts was uncharacteristically low,
and perhaps unwittingly attributed this to "the shoe-
leather, street organization."
28
is often critical, if not decisive, in close New Jersey elections.
For example, in an opinion piece in USA Today, Walter E.
Fauntroy observed that the Rollins affair made sense on the
level of"electoral arithmetic" because a large, loyal black vote
is often the Democratic Party's margin of victory. Walter E.
Fauntroy, The Real Lessons Of The Rollins Affair, USA TODAY,
Dec. 1, 1993, Op. Ed., at Al1. As a matter of political strat-
egy, therefore, if the Democratic Party fails to use its best ef-
forts to turn out loyal black Democrats, the party will lose
close elections. Id. See also Young, supra note 15 (quoting state-
ments by Whitman's former campaign manager, brother Daniel
Todd: "The State of New Jersey is still a state that is very sus-
ceptible to a well-run shoe leather campaign.'.27 Boasting supra note 21 (reporting Owens' statement
that he had "received word... that some of [his organization's]
clergy had been approached"). Butsee Ministers Sue, supra note
18 (stating that to date no one had admitted being approached);
Strategist Testifies, supra note 18 (reporting that no one had
come forward with firsthand knowledge of being approached).
2s Edsall & Gladwell, supra note 3 (quoting Todd as say-
ing, "A Democratic statewide incumbent candidate doesn't
come out of Hudson County [with] under 25,000 [votes]. A
Democratic incumbent candidate doesn't come out of Camden
with only 40,000 votes .... There was a significant role played
by the shoe-leather, street organizations."). Daniel Todd's state-
ments were made prior to Rollins' November 9 remarks to the
Washington reporters, and were viewed by the press as inad-
vertent corroboration of Rollins' account. See also Demos Stalled
In New Jersey Election Probe In New Denial That Black Voting
Was Suppressed, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 27, 1993, at A2 ("Explain-
ing his sister's victory during a panel discussion two days after
the election, Todd said, '[A well-run shoe leather campaign] is
where a lot of our effort went and a lot of our planning -
getting out the vote on one side and vote sup . . .' breaking off
before resuming, 'and keeping the vote light in other areas."').
Whitman vehemently denied Rollins' statements,z9
a group of black ministers filed a slander action in fed-
eral court,30 state and federal authorities launched in-
vestigations,31 a grand jury questioned Rollins,32 and the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) filed a federal
suit claiming violations of federal voting rights laws and
asking the court to overturn the election.
3 3 Under oath,3
Rollins told Democratic lawyers that he had lied to the
Washington reporters3 s and that he had only been taunt-
ing his Democratic counterpart, James Carville, cam-
paign manager for James Florio.3 6 The investigations were
terminated,3 7 and the DNC dropped its federal suit with-
out prejudice
38
C PriorAttemptsAt Vote Suppression
By The Republican National Committee
The lawsuit filed by the DNC against Rollins was
not the first time that the DNC accused the Republican
Party of targeting black voting for "suppression" in New
Further corroboration was provided by the statements of Carl
Golden, Whitman's campaign spokesman, who was quoted in
the press on November 4 as saying, "We cut the (Democratic)
margin in Essex and Hudson (two urban counties with large
black and Latino constituencies). Sometimes vote suppression
is as important in this business as vote-getting." Criminal Probe,
supra note 4.
29Boasting, supra note 21 ('Ms. Whitman, on hearing this,
went ballistic. 'It didn't happen,' she said. 'I don't campaign
that way. I urge people to vote. I don't suppress votes.'"); Crimi-
nalProbe, supra note 4 (quotingWhitman as stating that Rollins
"flat-out lied"); Edsall & Gladwell, supra note 3 (reporting that
Whitman vehemently denied Rollins' statements).
30 Linda Bean, Can Clergy Prove Slander In Rollins' Re-
marks, N.J. L.J., Nov. 29, 1993, at 5 (reporting defamation
suit by multiple plaintiffs, including Al Sharpton, Jesse Jack-
son, and ministers' division of Jackson's New York-based Rain-
bow Coalition); Ministers Sue, supra note 18 (same). Rever-
end Ezekiel Bey, President of the General Baptist Convention
of New Jersey, subsequently filed a second federal slander law-
suit. Second Lawsuit Filed Against Ed Rollins, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 13, 1993, at 7.
31 Criminal Probe, supra note 4 (reporting investigations
by U.S. Attorney in Newark and New Jersey Attorney Gen-
eral); Edsall & Gladwell, supra note 4 (same).
32 Strategist Testifies, supra note 18.
33 Criminal Probe, supra note 4; Edsall & Gladwell, supra
note 4.
34See Rosenstiel, supra note 5.
35See Rollins, Under Oath, supra note 6. During deposi-
tion, Rollins was also questioned about similar statements he
allegedly made to GOP strategist Mary Matalin. Wade Lam-
bert, Legal Beat, WAU. ST. J., Nov. 24, 1993, at B1. Rollins
denied that he had bragged to Matalin. Id. Rollins also denied
widespread reports that he had made similar remarks at a Wash-
ington-area dinner party. Id.
36 Bean, supra note 14 (reporting that Rollins testified he
had only been "playing head games" with James Carville);
Rollins, Under Oath, supra note 6 (same). See also Thomas B.
Edsall, Rollins: An "Inside-the-Beltway" Game: Deposition Of-
Jersey.39 In 1981, Democratic gubernatorial candidate
James Florio lost to Republican Thomas Kean in an elec-
tion that produced the narrowest margin of victory in
the history of the state.40 Because New Jersey law allows
candidates to become governor with only a single-vote
margin of victory,4' Florio requested a manual recount
of voting in all districts.4 Florio also demanded an in-
vestigation into charges that the Republican National
Committee (RNC) had harassed and intimidated mi-
nority voters under the guise of an anti-fraud, "ballot
security" program. The recount produced virtually no
change,44 and prosecutors investigating the ballot secu-
rity measures found no evidence that the election had
been tainted.
4
Although Florio eventually conceded defeat,46 the
Democratic State Committee (DSC), together with the
DNC and various individual New Jersey voters, insti-
tuted a civil action in the federal district court for New
Jersey.47 The plaintiffs alleged that the RNC's ballot se-
curity program had discouraged qualified black and His-
fers Insight Into Consultant's Characte, Thinking, WAsH. PoST,
Nov. 21, 1993, atA4 ("Rollins, by his account under oath, was
just trying to get under Carville's skin, hoping that some re-
porters would call Carville to describe the vote suppression,
telling him 'Rollins kicked your ass ... and here's how he did
it,' without ever writing about it. But as the breakfast meeting
with reporters progressed, Rollins said in retelling under oath
what happened: 'All of a sudden it became dear to me that
this wasn't going to be one reporter calling Carville .... If I
thought for one single moment this was going to go this way, I
would never have mentioned it. This is an inside-the-Beltway
bulishit game that I've become the victim of').
37 Stassen-Berger, supra note 7.
mDemocrats Drop Suit, supra note 7.
3 Karlan, supra note 9, at 1475 n.51. See also Boasting,
supra note 21 (reporting that Republican Party has history of
trying to reduce black voter turnout in dose elections).
40 See supra note 14.
41 Richard J. Meislin, Official Tallies Show Kean Leading In
New Jersey, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1981, at Al.
4
1 Joseph F Sullivan, Florio Asks For Recount Of All Votes,
N.Y IMES, Nov. 13, 1981, at B3.
43 Selwyn Raab, Jersey Inquiry Is Planned On Vote Security
Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1981, §2, at 6 (reporting that Floio
asked Essex County Prosecutor to coordinate statewide inves-
tigation to determine whether irregularities were caused by
ballot security program).
44 Joseph F. Sullivan, Florio Concedes Governor's Race To
Kean In New Jersey, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1981, atAl (reporting
that, after vote recount, Kean's lead remained virtually un-
changed).
45 David W, Dunlap, Poll Team Chief In Jersey Leaves His
G.O.P. Post, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1981, at B2 (reporting that
Essex County Prosecutor would not bring charges against any-
one involved in ballot security force).
46 Sullivan, supra note 44 (reporting that, after 27 days of
uncertainty, Florio conceded defeat to Kean).
47 Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm.,
Civ. No. 81-3876 (D.NJ. filed Nov. 1, 1981).
panic voters from voting in the gubernatorial election 8
and averred that the conduct had violated New Jersey
voters' Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights as
well as voting rights protected by federal statute.
49
RNC officials defended the ballot security plan as
an independent venture to identify and correct vote fraud
and ensure the integrity of the election. ° Apparently
believing that the state's procedures for detecting vote
fraud were inadequate, the RNC hired a team of con-
sultants, the self-described "Ballot Security Task Force"
(BSTF). s l The anti-fraud procedures followed by the
BSTF were strikingly similar to those followed by New
Jersey election supervisors. They differed, however, in
several critical details.
Under New Jersey law, election supervisors mail a
non-forwardable sample ballot to all registered voters.sz
If the ballot is returned, the supervisor sends the voter a
second letter (this one forwardable), stating that the
sample ballot had been returned and requesting the
voter's new address.53 Voters who fail to respond are
placed on a "challenge list," and may be challenged by
designated officials at the polls.
54
The BSTF, by contrast, based its initial mailing on
an outdated voter registration list, and limited the scope
of its mailing to predominantly black and Hispanic dis-
tricts in New Jersey.55 The envelopes stated that the let-
ters should not be forwarded but should be returned to
the sender ffundelivered.s 6 The BSTF received more than
45,000 returned letters.57 Without making a second at-
tempt to locate the missing voters at a different address,
48 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Dedaratory and In-
junctive Relief at 1-2, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republi-
can Nat'l Comm. (D.NJ. 1981) (Civ. No. 81-3876).
49 Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for Declaratory and In-
junctive Relief at 2, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican
Nat'l Comm. (D.NJ. 1981) (Civ. No. 81-3876). The DNC
sought relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a)(1), 1971(a)(2),
1973(i)(b), 1983, 1985(3). Id.
S°Robert Joffee, Democrats Accuse GOP Of Intimidating
Minorities In N.J. Voting, WASH. Posr, Nov. 8, 1981, atA8 (re-
porting that RNC openly admitted to funding ballot security
program, and quoting Richard Richards, GOP National Chair-
man, as saying that anyone opposed to ballot security obvi-
ously must be supportive of election fraud).
51 Richard J. Meislin, Jersey Vote Controversy Moves Fur-
ther In Courts, N.Y TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1981, at 34 (reporting that
RNC coordinated and funded ballot security operations).
52NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:31-6.6, 19:31-5 (West 1989).
S31d. § 19:31-15.
4 Id.
55 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Declaratory and In-
junctive Relief at 9, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican






the BSTF converted the 45,000 letters directly into a
challenge list. 8
Less than two weeks before the election, the RNC
delivered its challenge list to the election supervisors and
requested that the supervisors strike the persons on the
list from voter registration rolls s9 The Commissioners of
Registration refused after discovering that the RNC had
based its mailing on outdated information. 60 The RNC
announced through the news media that the Committee
would persist in its attempt to secure ballot integrity.61
On election day, the RNC posted large signs in poll-
ing areas, printed in red, reading:
WARNING
THIS AREA IS BEING PATROLLED BY THE
NATIONAL BALLOT
SECURITY TASK FORCE
IT IS A CRIME TO FALSIFY A BALLOT OR
TO VIOLATE ELECTION LAWS6
The signs offered a reward of $1,000 for information
leading to the arrest and conviction of anyone violating
New Jersey election laws.63 The RNC posted the signs
in violation of state law requiring political material to
be kept at a distance from the polls. 6 The signs did not
identify their source, and so appeared to be non-parti-
san announcements.
6
In addition to posting signs, the RNC hired an "army
of workers," including off-duty county deputy sheriffs




67 Id.; see also David S. Broder, Inquiry Asked In N.J. Elec-
tion, WAsH. Posr, Nov. 10, 1981, at A2 (describing Ballot Se-
curity Task Force activities); Joffee, supra note 50 (same); Ri-
chard J. Meislin, Jersey Controversy Widens Over GOP Patrols
At Polls, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1981, § 2, at 25 (same); Meislin,
supra note 51 (same).
63 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Declaratory and In-
junctive Relief at 11, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican
Nat'l Comm. (D.NJ. 1981) (Civ. No. 81-3876).
6MId. (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 19:34-15 (West 1989)). In
fact, on election day the DNC successfully petitioned a Tren-
ton judge to disband the Ballot Security efforts. Joffee, supra
note 50 (reporting that on election day Trenton judge issued
statewide order enjoining use of signs, which he said violated
state law by failing to say who paid for them); Richard J.
Meislin, Jersey's Ballots Impounded With Tiny Margin Waver-
ing; New York Prison Bonds Win, N.Y. TiM s, Nov. 5, 1981, at
A] (reporting that New Jersey court found signs illegal).
65 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Declaratory and In-
junctive Relief at 11, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican
Nat'l Comm. (D.N.J. 1981) (Civ. No. 81-3876); see also
Meislin, supra note 62 (reporting that Trenton resident had
called toll-free number listed on posters and had unsuccess-
fully attempted to determine who was behind security task
force operations).
Hispanic polling places.66 The off-duty law enforcement
workers prominently displayed revolvers, two-way ra-
dios, and BSTF armbands.6 They challenged voters at
the polls, stopping and questioning prospective voters,
and refusing to allow prospective voters to enter polling
places. They also ripped down the signs of one candi-
date and forcibly restrained poll workers from assisting
voters in casting their ballots.6
According to the DNC, the BSTF's tactics were part
of a conspiracy designed to intimidate, harass and co-
erce black and Hispanic voters not to vote 69 The DNC
charged that the BSTF acted with the intent to deprive
the voters - targeted because of their race - of their
rights of equal protection under the law and their right
to vote.7 0 Two voters joined as plaintiffs in the lawsuit,
alleging that the BSTF had intimidated and ha'rassed
them at voting sites.7 ' One voter claimed that she did
not vote because of the actions of the BSTF.7The DNC
requested that the court issue an injunction ordering the
RNC to refrain from undertaking similar ballot security
measures across the country73
The lawsuit filed by the DNC produced a 1982
settlement agreement between the parties and a con-
sent order from Federal District Judge Dickinson R.
Debevoise binding the RNC on a national level to re-
frain from further use of ballot integrity programs.74 The
DNC subsequently invoked the settlement order in 1986
66 Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for Declaratory and In-
junctive Relief at 11, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican








74 SettlementAgreement at 1-2, Democratic Nat'l Comm.
v. Republican Nat'l Comm. (D.NJ. 1981) (Civ. N 81-3876).
The RNC agreed, among other things, to "refrain from under-
taking any ballot security activities in polling places or elec-
tion districts where the racial or ethnic composition of such
districts is a factor in the decision to conduct... such activi-
ties and where a purpose or significant effect of such activities
is to deter qualified voters from voting." Id.
7s Bill Peterson, Democrats Sue Over GOP's Voter Project,
WASH. PosT, Oct. 8, 1986, at A4 (reporting that DNC had
filed suit alleging RNC had violated Voting Rights Act and
New Jersey consent decree).
76 Nicholas M. Horrock, GOP Turned 60,000 In To FBI,
CHi. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1986, at C8 (reporting that Republican
leaders believed one of most serious national problems was
vote fraud, and, accordingly, that RNC initiated ballot integ-
rity program to prevent election process from being "des-
ecrated").
7' Thomas B. Edsall, 'Ballot Security' Effects Calculated;
GOP Aide Said Louisiana Effort 'Could Keep The Black Vote
Down,' WASH. Posr, Oct. 25, 1986, at Al.
78Peterson, supra note 75.
when the RNC embarked on another highly publicized
ballot security effort in Louisiana.75 In that case, an RNC-
financed ballot security team again used a letter cam-
paign, allegedly to purge the state rolls of illegitimate
voters and to ensure the integrity of the election.76 The
ballot security team sent non-forwardable, anonymous
letters" to registered voters in districts that had voted
over seventy-five percent for Walter F Mondale, the
Democratic Presidential candidate in 1984.78 This vot-
ing pattern was confined almost exdusively to predomi-
nantly black districts.79 Undelivered letters were returned
to the RNC, which filed 30,000 voter challenges with
state election authorities0 in an effort to get the voters,
most of them black,8' purged from the rolls.
8 2
After the primaries, Democratic voters challenged
the ballot security measures in state court 3 where State
District Judge Richard E. Lee called the ballot security
measures "an insidious scheme by the Republican Party
to remove blacks from voting rolls,"14 and ordered regis-
trars to refrain from using RNC information to purge
voters from the rolls.85 The DNC subsequently filed a
$10 million lawsuit with Judge Debevoise in Federal
District Court in New Jersey, alleging violations of the
Voting RightsAct of 1965 and the 1982 consent order.86
According to the DNC, the ballot integrity program in
Louisiana was part of an RNC effort in seven other states
to illegally purge one million black and'.Hispanic voters
79 Paul Taylor, RNC Agrees To End Ballot Security Plan,
WASH. POSr, Oct. 21, 1986, atAl. See also Philip Lentz, Law-
suit Bares GOP Bid To Bar Black Voters, CHi. TRIB., Oct. 26,
1986, at C5 (reporting that Republicans targeted areas that
voted eighty percent Democratic in 1984, and that blacks were
only group of voters to vote so heavily Democratic).
80 Michael J. Bums, Judge Blocks Voter Purge, Calls It Plot
Against Blacks, ALEXAmDRiA DAILY TowN TALK, Sept. 25, 1986,
at Al.
"I George Andreassi, Judge Orders Democrats To Withhold
Evidence Embarrassing GOP, UNrr= PRmS INT'L, Oct. 20,1986,
General News.
" Edsall, supra note 77 (reporting that letters were turned
over to election officials in effort to have names purged from
voter rolls); Peterson, supra note 75 (reporting that letters re-
turned to RNC triggered process likely to culminate in voter
being challenged at polls); Taylor, supra note 79 (reporting
that undelivered letters became basis for asking that names be
purged from registration rolls).
13 Marsha Shuler & Don Lewis, Voter Purge Stopped, BA-
TON ROUGE MORNING ADvocATE, Sept 30, 1986, at Bi.
8 Burns, supra note 80 (reporting statements by District
Court Judge Richard E. Lee in his injunction against ballot
security program); Edsall, supra note 77 (same).
's Long v. Gremillion, Civ. No. 142,389 (D. La. decided
Sept. 25, 1986) (Judgment and Preliminary Injunction). See
also Taylor, supra note 79 (reporting that Louisiana judge is-
sued preliminary injunction preventing registrars from purg-
ing names, after ruling that ballot security program had singled
out blacks).
16 Peterson, supra note 75.
from the rolls and to keep those voters away from the
polls on election day.87
Although the RNC denied any wrongdoing,m their
case was harmed by disclosure of a memo from Kris
Wolfe, a Midwest regional director for the RNC, to Lanny
Griffith, a Southern regional director for the Commit-
tee.s9 In a memo concerning the Louisiana ballot secu-
rity program, Wolfe wrote:
I know this is really important to you. I would guess
this program would eliminate at least 60,000 to
80,000 folks from the rolls. If this is a close race,
which I assume it is, this could keep the black vote
down considerably °
The lawsuit was settled nine months after the elec-
tion, when both parties agreed to amend the 1982 con-
sent order to require the RNC to submit any ballot se-
curity plan to federal court for approval. 9'
In 1990, the DNC again complained to Judge
Debevoise that the Republican Party was violating the
court's order with ballot integrity mailings in North
Carolina.92 In this instance, the state Republican Party
mailed 150,000 postcards, many of them to heavily black
districts.93 The postcards contained a false statement that
new residents could not vote in the district for 30 days.
94
The postcards also threatened to prosecute any individual
who voted fraudulently.9s Judge Debevoise agreed that
the conduct appeared to violate the order,96 but told the
DNC that he could not take action both because the
alleged violations occurred outside the court's jurisdic-
tion and because there was no conclusive proof that the
Republican National Committee (as opposed to the
North Carolina Republican State Committee) initiated
the mailings.
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Finally, the DNC invoked the 1982 settlement agree-
ment in the 1993 New Jersey litigation, Democratic
National Committee v. Rollins. The DNC apparently be-
87 Andreassi, supra note 81; Horrock, supra note 77.
" See Taylor, supra note 79 (reporting that RNC insisted
it had merely been trying to keep dead or nonexistent people
from voting); Martin Tolchin, GOP Memo Tells Of Black Vote
Cut, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 25, 1986, § 1, at 7 (same).
8 Philip Lentz, GOP Bid To Bar Black Voters Bared In
Democrat's Lawsuit, CHI. TRuB., Oct. 25, 1986, at Cl (report-
ing release of memo during federal court hearing in Newark).
" Edsall, supra note 77; Lentz, supra note 89; Tolchin,
supra note 88.
91 Settlement Stipulation and Order of Dismissal at 2,
Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm. (D.NJ.
1986) (Civ. No. 86-3972) (modifying 1981 consent order to
prohibit RNC from participating in any ballot security plan
without express approval of federal court). See also Bill
Peterson, GOP Agrees To Settle 'Ballot Security' Suit, WASH.
Posr, July 24, 1987, at A3 (reporting that RNC and DNC
agreed to settle lawsuit); BemardWeinraub, Suit Charging GOP
Sought To Cut Black Vote Is Settled, N.Y. TIMEs, July 24, 1987,
at A15 (same).
9z B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., The 1990 Campaign; Judge
Assails G.O.P Mailing in Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1990,
lieved that Rollins' alleged scheme should be viewed on
a continuum with the RNC's prior attempts to "sup-
press" black voting - i.e., Rollins' alleged scheme, like
the RNC's scheme in 1980, targeted heavily black,
Democratic strongholds for a demobilization effort.
Accordingly, the DNC prepared a motion asking Judge
Debevoise to consolidate the 1993 action with the 1981
action.98 Judge Debevoise denied the motion for con-
solidation, stating, "Though both cases deal in a very
general way with charges of attempts to reduce voting
by minority voters, the facts are totally dissimilar."99
D. Conclusion
The battle between the RNC and the DNC over
the RNC's efforts to "suppress" black voting does not
have clear winners or losers. Although the 1982 consent
order proved useful as a tool for curbing RNC ballot
security measures on a national level, the instrument
ultimately has little utility as a method for curing the
unique form of race-based campaign behavior at issue
in these elections. The 1982 consent order expressed no
judicial opinion of the RNC's race-based efforts to de-
mobilize Democratic voters, and, as a result, the dis-
putes between the RNC and the DNC in the 1980's
focused less upon principles of substantive voting rights
law and focused more upon the rights of the parties under
the terms of the consent order. Thus, not only did the
consent order not add to the body of law delimiting unfair
election practices, but it allowed contract principles to
permeate and control the conduct of the parties.
In part, the pyrrhic victories produced by the 1982
consent order are a function of the highly political na-
ture of party litigation, 00 a phenomenon which most
likely would have influenced the 1993 lawsuit as well.
For example, in Democratic National Committee v. Rollins,
at B9 (reporting DNC's effort to invoke settlement agreement




' See id. (reporting that Judge Debevoise agreed with
DNC and criticized RNC for not doing enough to ensure that
Republican Party's ballot security program did not become
effort to intimidate minority voters).
9 7
1d.
98 See Notice of Motion for Consolidation and Expedited
Discovery at 2, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Rollins (D.N.J.
1993) (Civ. No. 93-4992).
"9Transcript ofProceedings at 6, Democratic Nat'l Comm.
v. Rollins (D.N.J. 1993) (Civ. No. 93-4992).
100 See Robert M. Brill & James J. Bjorkman, New York's
Election Law, N.Y. U., Dec. 15, 1993, at 2 (describing elec-
tion law litigation as inherently political and observing that
party litigation is little-known but central battleground of par-
tisan politics).
the DNC charged Rollins with violating New Jersey citi-
zens' federal voting rights, and yet the relief requested
by the DNC was a new election.' 0' The DNC's distinct
interest in gaining another opportunity to win the gu-
bernatorial election would therefore have governed the
contours of the 1993 litigation and would have deter-
mined the strategy used by the Democratic Party to liti-
gate the voters' claims. In particular, to succeed with its
request for a new election, the DNC would have had to
demonstrate that Rollins' alleged conduct had deterred
a sufficient number of voters to overcome the margin of
victory, approximately 27,000 votes. As a result, the liti-
gation would have focused on the narrow issue of elec-
tion outcome; the case would have centered around
whether Rollins' alleged conduct had an impact upon a
single election, the court's analysis would have focused
upon whether the alleged scheme was sufficiently cor-
rupting to merit a new election, and the parties most
likely would have ignored the scheme's incremental or
long-term harmful effect on voters' rights. In so far as
the litigation would have failed to take a holistic view of
the political process, the litigation would also have failed
to discuss the broader significance of RNC efforts to
demobilize black voters. The litigation therefore would
likely have failed to adequately address qualitative (as
opposed to quantitative) voter injury.Absent such a care-
ful discussion of injury to the voter, the "claim" brought
by the political party begins to look more like an elec-
tion-based claim belonging to the politician rather than
an anti-discrimination claim belonging to the voter.
In sum, litigation brought by one political party
against another does not seem to be the most effective
vehicle for protecting the full range of voter interests
implicated by race-based political conduct. Both the
1981 and the 1993 litigation show that political parties
have interests that are distinct from those of the voter
and that litigation strategies employed by political par-
ties may therefore focus on a select category of voting
rights claims or remedies. As such, party litigation is self-
serving, threatens to distract the court from a qualita-
tive look at the nature of the voter injury, and fails to
invoke the full range of protection offered to minority
citizens under federal voting rights law.
'01 Complaint at 22, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Rollins
(D.N.J. 1993) (Civ. No. 93-4992).
'10 YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
'03Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
04377 U.S. 533 (1964).
10s Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
PART II: GIVING CONTENT TO THE
RIGHT TO VOTE
A. Constitutional Principles Of Liberty And
Anti-Discrimination
1. Federalizing Political Rights
The United States Supreme Court in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins declared the right to vote to be a "fundamental
political right because preservative of all other rights."02
The Court in Wesberry v. Sanders elaborated by assert-
ing, "No right is more precious in a free country than
that of having a voice in the election of those who make
the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right
to vote is undermined." n Subsequent Supreme Court
cases reaffirm the proposition that voting serves as a
primary protector of the democratic process. Reynolds
v. Simsn ' 4 is a notable example. In Reynolds, the Court
stated, "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's
choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of represen-
tative government."'0 s
Thus, at the core of the right to vote is the interest
in preserving the ideal of equality and the legitimacy of
American government. Representative democracy is
based upon the paradoxical premise that all citizens are
equal, but that a comparatively small number of citi-
zens are elected to make decisions binding upon the
rest.1 6 Voting serves as one crucial means of ensuring
the continuing accountability and legitimacy of the gov-
ernment, and regular, fair elections provide citizens with
an opportunity to register their agreement or disagree-
ment:
0 7
The American approach to government is premised
upon the theory that, when citizens have the unfettered
right to vote, public officials will make decisions by the
democratic accommodation of competing beliefs, not by
deference to the mandates of the powerful. The Ameri-
can approach to civil rights is premised on the comple-
mentary theory that the unfettered right to vote is pre-
servative of all other rights."'8
106 See Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Po-
litical Participation And Section 2 Of The Voting Rights Act, 63
N.Y.U. L. REv. 449, 479 (1988) (describing foundations of
American system of elections and government).
108 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 140-41 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. Voting Rights Of Racial Minorities
In The Civil War Era
For much of this nation's history, the right to vote
has been abridged or denied on the basis of race.' 9 The
Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, mandated that
"[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote" no
longer be "denied or abridged ... by any State on ac-
count of race, color or previous condition of servitude." ' 0
A number of states, however, refused to obey the
Amendment's command, and continued to circumvent
the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition."' Initially, the
states used violence and other direct means to prevent
blacks from voting."2 Later, the states used ostensibly
race-neutral devices such as literacy tests with "grandfa-
ther" clauses and "good character" provisos to interfere
with black citizens' franchise rights." 3 All of these tac-
tics were designed to thwart black citizens' political par-
ticipation and to impair black voters' ability to influ-
ence political outcomes." 
4
Strong-arm resistance to minority voting persisted
for nearly a century after the ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment." 5 During that time, the Court recognized
that guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not
suffice to root out racially discriminatory voting prac-
tices and began expanding the meaning of voting be-
yond "mere balloting.""s Supreme Court precedent
makes clear that the right to vote means more than the
right to mark a piece of paper and drop it in a box,
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and that violations of the right to vote are not confined
to outright denials of the ballot but can occur when vot-
ing practices prevent the vote from being fully effective,
such as when the vote is given unequal weight." s In Lane
09Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816,2822 (1993).
"OU.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
"' Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816,2822-23 (1993).
"id. at 2823.
113Id.
I" See Steve Barber, et al., The Purging Of Empowerment:
Voter Purge Laws And The Voting Rights Act, 23 HAv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 483, 485 (detailing barriers to voting encoun-
tered by black voters since Civil War, and observing that moti-
vation behind these barriers was to impair black citizens' po-
litical participation); Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution
Of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial And Language Minorities,
in QuiEn REvOLUION IN THE SoutH: THE IMPACr OF THE Var-
ING RIGHTS Acr, 1965-1990 22 (Chandler Davidson & Ber-
nard Grofinan eds., 1994) (same).
"s Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2822-23 (1993).
116Id.
"
7 See South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950); United
States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 388 (1944).
"'See United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944). In
Saylorthe Court held that ballotbox stuffing violates the right
to vote, and held that the right to vote is not limited to ballot-
ing but includes the right to have the ballot honestly counted.
Id. at 388. The Court observed that the practice of ballot box
stuffing has a corrupting effect upon elections because it di-
v. Wilson, the Court recognized that the states would
continue to develop increasingly complex methods of
evading the Fifteenth Amendment." 9 The Lane Court
stated unequivocally that the Fifteenth Amendment
nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes
of discrimination and affirmed the Court's commitment
to striking down practices that effectively handicap the
exercise of the franchise while leaving the abstract right
to vote intact.
20
3. Giving Content To The Fifteenth Amendment
In The Post-Civil War Era
As the Supreme Court's Fifteenth Amendment ju-
risprudence evolved beyond the immediate concerns of
the post-Civil War era, and as the Court invoked the
Fifteenth Amendment to meet increasingly complex
methods of interfering with the political opportunities
of racial minorities, the Court justified the consequent
expansion of the Amendment's scope by emphasizing
principles of electoral legitimacy and full and fair politi-
cal participation by all citizens - core principles of the
right to vote. In Teny v. Adams, for example, the Court
expanded the scope of the Fifteenth Amendment when
it made clear that the Amendment's anti-discrimination
guarantee was not limited to election day practices but
extended to all phases of state elections.12' In Terry, an
independent, all white, political association, the Jaybirds,
conducted a poll prior to Alabama's final elections, the
results of which invariably determined the winner of the
final election.' The Court held that this practice vio-
lated the Fifteenth Amendment rights of black voters. 23
The Jaybird primary effectively eliminated any genuine
minishes the weight of votes actually cast in the district. Id.
The Court further noted that the practice of ballot box stuff-
ing violates the right to vote because it effectively denies a
free and fair choice to the voters; the right to vote includes the
voters' "right to have their expression of choice given full value
and effect by not having their votes impaired, diminished, di-
luted and destroyed by fictitious ballots fraudulently cast and
counted, recorded, returned, and certified." Id. at 386. Mod-
em courts continue to recognize that the right to vote is vio-
lated by practices which diminish the strength of votes cast.
See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2823 (1993) (recognizing
that dilution of voting power as well as absolute prohibition
on balloting can affect right to vote); Allen v. State Bd. of Elec-
tions, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (same); City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 126 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (ob-
serving that Fifteenth Amendment reaches diminutions as well
as outright denials of exercise of franchise).
"1 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
'2°Id. at 275.
'2' Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,470 (1953); accord Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (citing Terry for proposi-
tion that Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee of political equal-
ity extends to all phases of elections).
'22Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,463 (1953).
12id. at 470.
participation by black voters in the electoral process
because black citizens' votes in regular elections were
rendered meaningless by the pre-selection of candidates
by the Jaybirds.'2 4 The fact that black citizens retained
the "right to vote" in the state's final elections was im-
material to the Court's Fifteenth Amendment analysis.
The Jaybird primaries had corrupted the political pro-
cess by rendering black citizens' votes ineffective
In reaching its decision, the Terry Court underscored
the vital role of voting in a democratic system. The Court
noted that the actual effect of the state's scheme was to
deny black voters an "effective voice in the government
affairs of their country, state or community."'15 Similarly,
the Court described the function of voting in broad terms
of influence and control:
The effect of the whole procedure, Jaybird prima-
ries plus Democratic primary plus general election,
is to do precisely what the Fifteenth Amendment
forbids - strip Negroes of every vestige of influ-
ence in selecting the official who control the local
county matters that intimately touch the daily lives
of citizens.'2 6
The Court's attentiveness to the democratic function of
voting was similarly stressed in Justice Clark's concur-
ring opinion, where he described the Jaybird primary as
the de facto "locus of effective political choice"'
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In Smith v. AUuwright, the Supreme Court struck
down a similar practice. 2 In Allwright, the Texas Demo-
cratic Party passed a resolution at a party convention
that limited party membership to white voters.'29 The
practice was successfully challenged by black voters who
persuaded the Court that the primary elections oper-
ated as the exclusive method through which Texas state
officials were chosen.' 30 In a subsequent opinion, Jus-
tice Marshall noted the complex character of the claim
in Allwright.
124 Mary T. Boyle, Affirmative Action In The Democratic
Party: An Anaysis Of The Equal Division Rule, 7 J.L. & PoL
559, - (1991).
1sTerry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,466 (1953).
1
261d. at 469-70.
"' Id. at 484 (Clark, J., concurring).
'2321 U.S. 649,663-66 (1944) (finding that exclusion of
black voters from Texas primaries violates Fifteenth Amend-
ment).
29 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 656 (1944).
130 d. at 664.
"I, City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 127 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
32 See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960)
(citing Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), and noting com-
plexity of voting rights issue before Court). Racial gerryman-
ders are deliberate and arbitrary distortions of district bound-
aries for racial purposes. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct 2816, 2833
[Plaintiffs) did not question their access to the bal-
lot for general elections. Instead they argued, and
the Court recognized; that the value of their votes
have been diluted by their exclusion from partici-
pation in primary elections and in the slating of can-
didates by political parties.'
Thus, according to Justice Marshall, the Allwright Court
recognized that the underlying purpose of the Fifteenth
Amendment is to ensure the full participation of mi-
norities in the political process, and that guaranteeing
voters the formal ability to cast a ballot is only one means
of satisfying the Amendment's command. In cases where
electoral practices seriously impair the "value" of black
citizens' votes, the election is no longer free and the
choice of black voters is unconstitutionally affected.
Finally, in 1960, the Court faced one of the most
sophisticated methods of disenfranchisement: the
racial gerrymander.' 32 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,'33 the
Court considered the constitutionality of an Alabama
apportionment scheme which altered the shape of
Tuskegee from "a square to an uncouth twenty-eight
sided figure" in a manner alleged to exclude black
voters, and only black voters, from the city limits.'
34
Petitioners argued that the apportionment scheme
violated their Fifteenth Amendment rights by depriv-
ing them of their right to vote in Tuskegee.' 3 Respon-
dents argued that the voters had failed to state a claim
for relief; the voters would still be permitted to vote
in their new districts, and thus no "deprivation" of
their right to vote would occur.' 36 The Gomillion
Court agreed with the voters and found that the ap-
portionment scheme violated the voters' Fifteenth
Amendment rights. ' 37 The Court observed that while
the abstract right to vote might still belong to the
voters, the inevitable effect of the scheme was to de-
prive the black citizens of their right to cast a ballot
in Tuskegee and hence to deprive the black citizens
(1993) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,164 (1986)).
In the 1870's, for example, opponents of Reconstruction in
Mississippi concentrated the bulk of the black population in a
shoestring congressional district running the length of the Mis-
sissippi River, leaving five other districts with white majori-
ties. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2823 (1993) (citing Eric
Foner, RECONSrRuCrION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863-1877 590 (1988)).The Court has held that such schemes
violate the Constitution when they are adopted with a dis-
criminatory purpose. Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2823 (citing Roberts
v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), and White v. Register, 412 U.S.
755 (1973)).
13 3 6 4 U.S. 339 (1960).34 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
13S Id.
136Id.
37 Id. at 346.
of the "consequent advantages" that Tuskegee ballot-
ing privileges afford.'
38
In short, the "fencing out "1 of black voters in
Gomillion violated the Fifteenth Amendment both be-
cause the reapportionment effected a political segrega-
tion of black voters and because the scheme was en-
acted for the purpose of "despoiling" black citizens of
municipal benefits derived from balloting rights in
Tuskegee. 40 Thus, not only did the Gomillion Court rec-
ognize that the Fifteenth Amendment protects values
"beyond mere balloting," but, consistent with Wesberry
v. Sanders,14 1 the Gomillion Court also implicitly recog-
nized the larger, civic purpose of voting when it used
the Fifteenth Amendment to strike down practices that
threatened to corrupt the quality of post-election gov-
ernance.
4. Divergence Between The Fourteenth And
Fifteenth Amendments
One year after deciding Gomillion, the Supreme
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment also serves
as a basis for challenging racial gerrymanders. 142 In Baker
v. Carr, the Court recognized for the first time that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects against vote dilution.
4 3
In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court articulated the modem
standard for evaluating vote dilution claims under the
138d. The Gomillion Court did not expressly define the
"consequent advantages" of voting privileges. However, the
opinion devotes several pages to distinguishing the case at bar
from prior cases in which taxpayers sued to prevent a city
from redistricting. Id. at 342-345. In those cases, the city had
recently performed several "civic improvements" and the plain-
tiff taxpayers would have suffered a greatly increased tax bur-
den under the proposed districting plan. Id. The inference,
therefore, is that the GomilIion Court understood the "conse-
quent advantages" of voting to include the opportunity to in-
fluence the distribution of municipal resources.
'39 id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
140 id. at 347. In a concurring opinion, Justice Whittaker
argued that the apportionment scheme operated as an illegal
geographic segregation, rather than as an abridgement of the
right to vote, and that the black voters' complaint should have
been based upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 349
(Whittaker, J., concurring). In other words, because the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits racial segregation, and because the
redistricting scheme effected a geographic "fencing out" of black
voters for racial purposes, the scheme violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
"4 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
1
4 2 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1961) (holding
that claim of debasement of right to vote through
malapportionment presents justiciable controversy under Four-
teenthAmendment).The Fourteenth Amendment requires the
state to guarantee to all persons the privileges and immunities
of United States citizenship, due process of law, and the equal
protection of the laws. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 2.
"4 Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1961) (noting that
Equal Protection Clause: one person-one vote.144 In
Reynolds, an Alabama legislative apportionment scheme
created districts with unequal numbers of voters. 4 The
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
an equally weighted vote to all who participate in state
and federal elections. 14 6 Because the Alabama apportion-
ment scheme diluted the votes of citizens in heavily
populated districts, the scheme violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.
4 7
While the Court was developing modem standards
for vote dilution claims under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court con-
tinued to apply the Fifteenth Amendment to racial ger-
rymander cases. Indeed, the principle of one person-one
vote is actually derived from cases decided under the
Fifteenth Amendment;14 the Reynolds Court relied upon
a long series of Fifteenth Amendment cases in reaching
its conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment provides
a right to equal voting strength. 49 Thus, to the extent
that the modem constitutional rule against vote dilu-
tion has as its source the Fifteenth Amendment (the
explicit purpose of which is to protect against the "abridg-
ment" of racial minorities' voting rights), the Court im-
plicitly recognized that the group-oriented claims of vote
dilution are also within the scope of the Fifteenth
Amendment.
Court's holding departed from precedent). Vote dilution oc-
curs when laws or practices operate to diminish the voting
strength of an identifiable group of voters. For example, where
members of a racial minority group vote as a cohesive unit,
practices such as multimember or at-large electoral systems
can reduce or nullify minority voters' ability as a group to elect
the candidate of their choice. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816,
2823 (1993). See also Davidson, supra note 114, at 22.
Davidson draws a distinction between disenfranchisement and
dilution. Id. Disenfranchisement prohibits or discourages citi-
zens from voting. Id. Dilution, by contrast, can operate even
when all voters have full access to the polling place and are
assured that their votes will be fairly tallied. Id.
144377 U.S. 533, 559-60 (1964).
1 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537-41.
146 Id. at 559-60.
14 7 Id. at 568.
14s See James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From
Reynolds v. Sims To City Of Mobile v. Bolden: Have The White
Suburbs Commandeered The Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HAST.
L.J. 1, 62 (1982) (arguing that Reynolds Court relied upon
Fifteenth Amendment in reaching its decision that Fourteenth
Amendment contains analogous, unspoken, prohibition against
undervaluation of black citizens' votes).
4 Id. at 3, 9. The Reynolds Court cited Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); Smith v.
Al1wright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299 (1941); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Guinn
v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Ex pane Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 651 (1884); Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
Reynolds v. Sims, 562 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964).
Subsequently, however, the Court began to rely in-
creasingly upon the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) to adjudicate claims
of racial vote dilution,1s° and plaintiffs in racial vote di-
lution cases now normally seek relief under the more
favorable statutory standard of the VRA.' 51 As a result,
the Court has developed an extensive vote dilution ju-
risprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
VRA and has largely ignored the Fifteenth Amendment
as a mechanism for challenging modem voting rights
abuses)5 Nevertheless, in spite of the diminished atten-
tion paid to the Fifteenth Amendment, the debate over
the precise scope of the Fifteenth Amendment contin-
ues in contemporary Supreme Court cases, albeit in a
position of lesser prominence.
5. Recent Trends In Fifteenth Amendment
Jurisprudence: Reading The Fifteenth
Amendment Restrictively
Most recently, Justice Thomas offered a highly re-
strictive reading of the Fifteenth Amendment in Holder
v. Hall.1s3 In Holder, Thomas argued that, properly un-
derstood, the Fifteenth Amendment secures only "ac-
cess to the ballot.' s The Fifteenth Amendment is not
violated so long as members of racial minorities can "reg-
ister and vote without hindrance."'55 Thus, the Fifteenth
Amendment's command that the vote be fully effective
refers only to practices that directly affect access to the
ballot. Claims of vote dilution are simply not recognized
in the context of FifteenthAmendment jurisprudence.'
5 6
The alternative, Thomas argued, only immerses federal
courts in the "hopeless project of weighing questions of
political theory.
"'5 7
Justice Stevens disagreed, arguing thatThomas' char-
acterization of precedent would effectively vitiate im-
"ON. Jay Shepherd, 'Abridge" Too Far: Racial Gerryman-
dering, The Fifteenth Amendment, And Shaw v. Reno, 14 B.C.
THIRD WoRLD LJ. 337, 354-5 (1994).
'51 Pamela S. Karlan, All Over The Map: The Supreme
Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 251.
112 See Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule And Govern? Local
Legislative Delegations, RaciAl Politics, And The Voting RightsAct,
102 YALE W. 105, 203 n.202 (1992) (characterizing Court's
Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence prior to passage of VRA
as "halfhearted attempt to enforce" Amendment).
15 114 S.Ct- 2581, 2591 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment).
I Holder v. Hall, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 2605 n.20 (Thomas, J.,
concuiing in judgment).
"I Id. at 2606 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
156Id. at 2605, Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
1sT Id. at 2592 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
158 Id. at 2625 (Stevens, J., separate opinion).
1591d. at 2625 n.] (Stevens, J., separate opinion).
1601d.
361 See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 1158
(1993) (stating that Court's opinion "express[es] no view on
portant principles established in early Fifteenth Amend-
ment cases.5 8 In particular, Stevens attacked Thomas'
characterization of Gomillion v. Lightfoot as a ballot ac-
cess case, rather than the racial gerrymander case that it
was.'5 9 Stevens noted that, under Thomas' view, each
time a district changed its boundaries in such a way as
to prevent voters from casting ballots to re-elect an in-
cumbent official, the redistricting plan would be illegal,
a result which is dearly inconsistent with precedent and
untenable as a matter of practice.160
The Court's current position on the scope of the
Fifteenth Amendment is equivocal, as recent decisions
have declined to discuss the reach of the Fifteenth
Amendment.' 61 Nevertheless, contrary to the view of
Justice Thomas, Fifteenth Amendment precedent is not
limited to practices directly related to balloting.'6 Pre-
cedent only establishes that the Supreme Court has yet
to place express limitations on how far beyond balloting




Bakery. Cart'4 and Reynolds v. Sims'65 do not mark
the "death" of the Fifteenth Amendment, as some have
suggested.166 Although modem courts have marginalized
the Fifteenth Amendment, early Supreme Court cases
dearly establish that the Fifteenth Amendment is not a
limited-purpose Amendment, useful only so long as black
citizens are prevented from registering and casting a
ballot. Early voting rights cases used the Fifteenth
Amendment to strike down the most sophisticated meth-
ods of abridging the right to vote, and Supreme Court
cases during the 1960's applied the Fifteenth Amend-
ment to vote dilution claims without reservation. Thus,
the Fifteenth Amendment continues to hold great po-
the relationship between the Fifteenth Amendment and race-
conscious districting"), cited in Holder v. Hall, 114 S.Ct. 2581,
2605 (1994); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2493 (1995)
(refusing to decide "troubling and difficult constitutional ques-
tion" involving proper scope of Congress' authority under § 2
of Fifteenth Amendment).
6 See supra notes 115-141 and accompanying text.
113 Even Justice Thomas recognizes that the Court has not
foreclosed a broader interpretation ofvbting rights claims: "We
ourselves have tacitly acknowledged that our current view of
what constitutes an effective vote may be subject to reevalua-
tion, or at least that it may not provide an exclusive definition
of effective voting power...." Holder v. Hall, 114 S.Ct. 2581,
2596 n.8 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
'A369 U.S. 186 (1961).
16377 U.S. 533 (1964).
66See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 612 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (1964) (describing impact of Court's decision as
ddegating Fifteenth Amendment to "limbo of constitutional
anachronisms").
tential as an instrument for ensuring that the core prin-
ciples of the right to vote are protected and for striking
down race-based practices that interfere with the full
enjoyment of those principles by minority voters.
B. The Doctrine Of State Action
In The Context of Voting Rights
The Fifteenth Amendment does not reach purely
private conduct, but serves only as a limitation on the
powers of the government, both state and federal.167 As
a threshold matter, therefore, prior to determining
whether an election practice violates the substantive
provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment, courts must
determine whether the practice is fairly attributable to
the government. Is State action is most obvious in cases
where a state law is being challenged. 69 States can also
dominate an activity to such an extent that the activity's
participants must be deemed to act with the authority
of the government, and, as a result, fall under constitu-
tional constraints. 70 In cases where the involvement of
the state is less obvious, modem courts must make a
fact-bound, case-by-case determination of whether there
is a sufficient nexus between the state and the allegedly
unconstitutional action.'7' Factors which militate in fa-
vor of finding state action include: the extent to which
the actor relies upon government assistance and ben-
'67 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONStmONAL LAw, §
18-1, at 147 (1978).
'6' See generally Erwin Chemerinsk, Rethinking State Ac-
tion, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503 (1985); TRIBE, supra note 167, §
18-1, at 147.
69TRIBE, supra note 167, § 18-1, at 1147, citing Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'7°Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,620
(1991).
17" See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,
722 (1961) ("Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private con-
duct be attributed its true significance."); Lugar v. Edmonson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (suggesting that various
tests articulated in Supreme Court precedent are in fact dif-
ferent ways of characterizing fact-bound inquiry that confronts
Court in determining questions of state action). Modem courts
frequently rely upon the two-prong test articulated in Lugar.
See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614
(1991) (applying Lugar); see also Kevin R. Puvalowski, Immune
From Review?: Threshold Issues In Section 1983 Challenges To
The Delegate Selection Procedures Of National Political Parties,
62 FORDAM L. RIv. 409, 412-13 (1993) (surveying state ac-
tion doctrine in context of political parties and noting Court's
reliance on Lugar). First, courts must ask whether the claimed
constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right
or privilege having its source in state authority, and, second,
courts must ask whether the private party charged with the
deprivation can be described in all fairness as a state actor.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939-41.
efits,"7 whether the state has so far insinuated itself into
a position of interdependence with the actor that the
state must be recognized as a joint participant in the
activity,'"3 whether the actor is performing a traditional
government function,"4 and whether the injury caused
is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of gov-
ernmental authority.
175
The doctrine of state action is particularly problem-
atic in the context of political parties and state elec-
tions.176 Political parties have, until recently, been viewed
as purely private entities, unconnected to the state and
immune from the state action doctrine."' Political par-
ties, however, have also become almost exclusively re-
sponsible for administering the electoral process, and, in
that capacity, exercise state functions or operate as gov-
ernmental agencies."7 As a result, modem courts recog-
nize that the conduct of political parties can, at times,
constitute state action. 179 The hybrid character'80 of po-
litical parties, however, makes the precise scope of the
state action doctrine in this context unclear.'18
In Democratic National Committee v. Rollins, the
DNC argued that Rollins' conduct constituted state ac-
tion because the nexus between the state and the Re-
publican State Committee ("RSC") was sufficiently close
to justify treating Rollins as a state actor.18 The money
allegedly spent by Rollins represented a substantial por-
tion of the funds expended by the Whitman campaign,
172 Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485
U.S. 478 (1988), cited in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991).
U3 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961).
"7 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); cited in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991).
175 Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), cited in Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991); 4f
Leesville, 500 U.S. at 632 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that state action may only be found when actor carries badge
of government authority and represents government in some
capacity).
176See Puvalowski, supra note 171, at 415 (observing that
Supreme Court has struggled to define limits of state regula-
tion and judicial power with respect to actions of political par-
ties); TRIBE, supra note 167, § 13-23, at 787 (stating that ex-
tent to which state action doctrine applies to political parties
is uncertain).
"7 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
178 Smith v.Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
79 TRIBE, supra note 167, § 13-23, at 787.
180 Political parties can function as both purely private
political organizations as wel as quasi-governmental entities.
Id.
Is' Id.
182 Complaint at 12, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Rollins,
(D.N.J. 1993) (Civ. No. 93-4992).
New Jersey state law extensively regulates campaign fi-
nancing, and the RSC's overall campaign activities were
a sufficiently integral part of the electoral process to
constitute state action.' 3 The RSC disagreed, character-
izing the DNC's claim as naked assertion, unsubstanti-
ated by current law.' 4
Individually, the factors listed by the DNC prob-
ably would not convert Rollins' alleged conduct into state
action. A political party does not become a state actor
merely because it is subject to state regulation,'85 or be-
cause it receives substantial state funding, 1' 6 unless the
state's involvement constitutes compulsion or encour-
agement of the party's action. 87 Taken together, how-
ever, these factors arguably show a substantial nexus
between the state and the political party.
Additionally, the conduct at issue in the Rollins af-
fair would have been "electoral" rather than "private" or
"political," in the sense that the alleged scheme would
have been designed to influence votes, qua votes. Offer-
ing to pay a group of ministers in an effort to reduce
black voter turnout is not conduct undertaken to fur-
ther political aspirations, but serves as an attempt to
appropriate the process by which the people's repre-
sentatives are elected. As such, the scheme represents
conduct that is analytically closer to the party's quasi-
governmental function. Thus, given the unique applica-
tion of the state action doctrine in the context of state
elections, given the close nexus between the state and
the party, and given the scheme's dose analogue to the
party's quasi-governmental function, a Rollins-type
scheme arguably constitutes state action.
18id.
'8 Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-
Motion to Dismiss and to Obtain Other Relief, and in Oppo-
sition to Plaintiff's Motions at 7, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v.
Rollins, (D.NJ. 1993) (Civ. No. 93-4992).
's~Puvalowski, supra note 171, at 435 n.185.
'86 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982)
(holding that financial support alone is insufficient to consti-
tute state action).
187 Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action
And TheAllocation Of Responsibility For Fourteenth Amendment
Violations, 75 CORNELL L. Rv. 1053, 1079 (1990), cited in
Puvalowski, supra note 171, at 435 nn. 177, 185-6.
188 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363 (1915).
'9U.S. CONSr. amend. XV, § 2. See also South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (stating that § 2 of
Fifteenth Amendment grants Congress power to effectuate
Amendment, and finding VRA to be legitimate exercise of
that power).
190Initially, Congress assumed expansive authority to en-
force the command of the FifteenthAmendment. For example,
Congress passed-the Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140
(1870), which established criminal penalties for intimidating
minority voters, and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 15
(1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981), which protected
.social" as well as "political" rights of racial minorities. TIBE,
supra note 167, § 5-12, at 257; Shepherd, supra note 150, at
C. The Voting Rights Act Of 1965
1. Historical Background:
Section Two Of The Fifteenth Amendment
And Federal Voting Rights Statutes
Passed Pursuant Thereto
Section one of the Fifteenth Amendment is self-ex-
ecuting and may be enforced by private suit.88 Section
two grants Congress the authority to enforce the com-
mand of the Amendment by appropriate legislation.18
Initial attempts by Congress to enforce Section two were
frustrated by a series of restrictive Supreme Court opin-
ions,190 and, as a result, congressional activity under Sec-
tion two of the Fifteenth Amendment was largely non-
existent for the Amendment's first ninety years.' 9' Dur-
ing the 1960's, however, Congress renewed its interest
in protecting individual rights and sought once more to
take advantage of the Fifteenth Amendment's grant of
authority.192 Congress' first major voting rights law dur-
ing this period was the Civil Rights Act of 1964.193 The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 took the form of a regulation
of interstate commerce and thus avoided constitutional
controversy. 9' By 1965, however, the federal govern-
ment decided that stronger federal lawi.swere necessary
to protect Fifteenth Amendment rights,195 and, accord-
ingly; Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(VRA), 196 described by some as the most radical piece
of civil rights legislation since Reconstruction.
197
The VRA is a comprehensive federal guarantee of
meaningful political participation and of an effective
349. However, a series of restrictive Supreme Court cases lim-
ited the extent of Congress' authority. Se.g., United States
v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating Act in interest of
preserving states' autonomy); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883) (holding unconstitutional several provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1876) (holding unconstitutional several provisions in the En-
forcement Act of 1870). See also Shepherd, supra note 150, at
349 (arguing that early enforcement legislation was eviscer-
ated by unfavorable Supreme Court decisions narrowly con-
struingAmendment); Davidson, supra note 114, at 21 (same).
19' Davidson, supra note 114, at 22 (arguing that Fifteenth
Amendment, ignored by racist southern officials and racist
courts, was "dead letter").
' TRIBE, supra note 167, § 5-12, at 257.
19342 U.S.C § 2000a et seq. (1988).
'94 See TRIBE, supra note 167, § 5-12, at 257, citing
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964) (finding
provision in Act to be valid exercise of Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce).
'9' See Karlan, supra note 151, at 248 (quoting President
Johnson when he announced his intention to introduce VRA
as legislation: "Every device of which human ingenuity is ca-
pable has been used to deny [black citizens] the right to vote.").
19642 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1988).
1
97 TRIBE, supra note 175, § 5-14, at 263.
voice in government for minority voters. 9 The VRA
contains both permanent provisions directed at ensur-
ing the long-term security of voting rights across the
country, and temporary provisions directed at curbing
the most frequent and severe abuses of minority voting
rights, applicable only within a limited number ofjuris-
dictions with a history of depressed minority participa-
tion. 9 The temporary provisions were initially contro-
versial because they established a highly invasive federal
administrative process directed at increasing minority
voter registration as the principle means of enforcing
the Fifteenth Amendment.2 00 Section five was unsuc-
cessfully challenged as being an unconstitutional exer-
cise of Congress' authority to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.
20
In Katzenbach, in a five page summary of the states'
efforts to circumvent the command of the Fifteenth
Amendment, the Court detailed the wide-spread abuse
of minority voting rights.203 The Court concluded that
private suits brought by citizens under Section one of
the Fifteenth Amendment were simply inadequate to
fully protect the rights of minority voters.2n3 Individual
adjudication of voters' claims had proved too time-con-
suming, resulted in piecemeal treatment of the right to
vote, and was so cumbersome as to be a deterrent.201
Comprehensive reform from Congress was welcome, and
the Court quoted approvingly from the Act's legislative
history: "The burden is too heavy - the wrong to our
citizens is too serious - the damage to our national con-
science is too great not to adopt more effective mea-
sures than exist today."
205
The Katzenbach Court concluded by rejecting South
Carolina's argument that Congress' authority under the
198 Lani Guinier, The Triumph Of Tokenism, in THE TY-
ANNY OF THE MAJORmT 49 (1994). See also Pamela S. Karlan,
Maps And Misreading: The Role Of Geographic Compactness In
Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. REv. 173,
183 (1989) (observing that VRA was designed not only to
bring black voters into voting booth but also to bring concerns
of black citizens into halls of government).
19942 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
100See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323
(1966) (plaintiffs asserting unconstitutionality of Act on
grounds that Act violated separations of powers by transfer-
ring judicial function to Attorney General). The Act autho-
rizes the Attorney General to send federal officials into any
state whose voter registration patterns meet certain criteria.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973d (1988). The Act does not require
the Attorney General to make a detailed determination before
granting a remedy, but rather creates a presumption in favor
of the voter against certain "tests" or "devices." Id. § 1973b.
The determinations of the Attorney General are final, subject
to a narrow form of after-the-fact review. Id. § 1973b(a), (d).
201383 U.S. 301 (1966).
202 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-15
(1966).
2w Id. at 314-315.
204 Id.
Fifteenth Amendment was limited to fashioning general
remedies, and that courts retained the responsibility for
carefully adjudicating claims of voting rights abuse.205
The Court found that Congress' grant of authority un-
der the Fifteenth Amendment is not circumscribed by
any internal limitations and that the exercise of Con-
gressional power to construe and protect the Fifteenth
Amendment is to be measured against the highly defer-
ential standard established in McCulloch v. Maryland.
2 07
Subsequent challenges to Congress' efforts to enforce
the Fifteenth Amendment have been unsuccessful. 20 8
Once installed, the VRA's federal scheme for moni-
toring state voting practices proved immediately suc-
cessful in ensuring racial minorities access to the voting
booth.2°9 Whereas before the VRA registration of eli-
gible black voters lagged as much as fifty percent be-
hind that of whites, by the early 1970's the gap between
black and white registration in several of the targeted
southern states had fallen to well below ten percent.
210
Subsequently, however, it became increasingly apparent
that guaranteeing poll access to minorities was not suffi-
cient to guarantee meaningful political participation and
an effective voice in government. As a result, Congress
amended Section two of the VRA in 1982 to lower
plaintiffs burden and to permit claims of vote dilution.
2 1'
Specifically, Congress amended Section two (a) to re-
quire a "results" test rather than an "intent" test:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgment of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color .... 12
2id. at 314, quoting H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. - (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2442.
2w Id. at 326-27.
7 Id. at 326-27, quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 421 (1819) ("Let the ends be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the con-
stitution, are constitutional.").
zs See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970)
(unanimously upholding constitutionality of provision in VRA
Amendments of 1970); Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,
161 (1977) (plurality opinion upholding constitutionality of
VRA provision requiring benign discrimination with respect
to voting).
z09 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2823 (1993).210 d.
211 See id.; Lani Guinier, The Tyranny Of The Majority, in
THE TYRAnNY OF THE MMoamr 49 (1994) ('Although every-
one had a vote, it was apparent that some people's votes were
qualitatively less important than others. [This concern] led
Congress to amend the Voting Rights Act.").212Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2(a), 42 U.S.C. § 197 3(a)
(1988).
Congress also amended Section two (b) to include a
"totality of circumstances" test for assessing claims of
voting rights abuse:
[Section 2(a) is violated where] ... the political
processes leading to nomination or election are not
equally open to participation by members of [a pro-
tected class] ... in that its members have less oppor-
tunity than other members of the electorate to par-
ticipate in the political process and to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice.
213
Thus, the VRAs broad scrutiny of the circumstances
leading to the voter's claim is more deferential towards
minority voters than modem judicial standards under
the Fifteenth Amendment and reflects Congress' view
that abuses of minority voting rights should not be evalu-
ated in isolation of other political and social processes.
2. Dispute Over The Proper Scope Of The VRA
Congress amended the VRA in order to ensure that
the guarantee of the Fifteenth Amendment finally be-
came reality,214 and, consistent with this, early Supreme
Court cases advocated the "broadest possible" reading
of the VRA in order to ensure that the remedial pur-
poses of the Act were met. s In recent years, however,
the Supreme Court has taken a more restrictive approach
to the VRA in an effort to limit federal intervention in
political processes.21 6 In particular, case law under the
amended Section two has developed an elaborate set of
rules for weeding out marginal Section two claims, which
rules have severely limited the section's scope
1 7
Kathryn Abrams proposes that the Court's current
interpretation of the VRA imposes an unjustifiably nar-
row view of the Act's mandate and therefore leaves the
rights of minorities unprotected.2 18 According to Abrams,
2 13Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973o(b)
(1988).214 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,556 (1969).
See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308
(1966) (observing that VRA was designed to banish blight of
racial discrimination in voting, which had infected electoral
process for a century).
20 See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567
(1969) (arguing that legislative history mandates that VRA be
given "broadest possible scope").
216 See Karlan, supra note 151, at 245 (arguing that Growe
v. Eminson, 113 S.Ct. 1075 (1993), and Voinovich v. Quilter,
113 S.Ct. 1149 (1993), indicate Court's desire to distance it-
self from "political thicket").
217 See Karlan, supra note 151, at 262-3 (describing Su-
preme Court case law under amended § 2, and observing that
Court has developed bright-line test for weeding out marginal
§ 2 lawsuits).
the Court recognizes only "election-outcome claims"
and ignores clear statutory language that allows mi-
nority voters to bring claims for "impaired ability to
participate" in the political process.219 Participation
claims are critical to a fully effective VRA, as the elec-
toral process cannot by itself adequately translate
minority preferences into substantive policy.220 If the
mandate of the VRA is to be fully realized, Abrams
argues, Section two claims must protect not only the
opportunity to cast a ballot in general elections but
also the opportunity to participate in important con-
sensus-building activities that precede and follow the
ballot.2'
One significant feature of Abrams' argument is
her expansive understanding of the "political pro-
cesses" protected by the VRA. For example, Abrams
argues that neighborhood, union, or PTA gatherings
at which people discuss their views on local issues
are political processes which contribute to or detract
from the political opportunities of minorities and
must be included in the lens through which courts
look for voter injuries.222 These events are crucial to
fostering the political interests of minority voters, and
a failure to monitor these stages threatens to vitiate
the advances gained in the area of-minority voting,
rights.m
The scholarship of Kathryn Abrams provides a
broad framework for arguing that Section two of the
VRA prohibits a Rollins-type scheme. A Rollins-type
scheme is designed to alienate black voters from the
political process by reducing the number of contacts
between black voters and the get-out-the-vote drive. In
addition, church meetings would be included within the
category of group activities identified by Abrams as im-
portant to the political opportunities of minority vot-
ers; at church meetings voters engage in informal ex-
changes through which partisans try to persuade one
711Abrams, supra note 106, at 452; see also Pamela S.
Karlan, Undoing The Right Thing: Single-Member Offices And
The Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. Rv. 1 (1991) (arguing that
recent developments in voting rights law threaten to retrench
notion of politics that VRA was intended to repudiate).
219Abrms, supra note 106, at 452.
r2°Abrams, supra note 106, at 488. See also Lani Guinier,
No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest For Political Equality, 77 VA.
L. R'v. 1413, 1494 (1991) (arguing that modem Supreme
Court measures black citizens' political participation solely by
reference to number of black candidates, and that right to vote
should indude not simply group's ability to elect candidates
of choice, but also ability to secure interests through legisla-
tive policy) cited in Davidson, supra note 114, at 22 n.5.
2
Z Abrams, supra note 106, at 504.
2Abrams, supra note 106, at 489. Cf Karlan, supra note
198, at 198-99 (describing political process as ranging "from
voting to holding public office").
m See Abrams, supra note 106, at 449-50.
another, and during which informal political alliances
are negotiated. 224 A Rollins-type scheme would operate
as a covert, unilateral attempt to interfere with that pro-
cess and would impair the meetings' productive norma-
tive features.
Abrams' scholarship, however, is often overly-ex-
pansive s For example, the legislative history of Sec-
tion two appears confined to a much narrower category
of pre-election practices, and thus, the broad mandate
Abrams finds in the Act is unsupported.26 In addition,
there is no obvious limiting principle to Abrams' argu-
ments. For example, Abrams imagines courts' scrutiny
as encompassing an exhaustive assessment of the elec-
toral practices or procedures. In other words, courts are
to examine political practices:
not simply for their impact on the ability to elect,
but for their effect on the ability to interact with,
and influence others in group-mediated ways. For
example, courts would consider evidence that mi-
norities had been excluded from caucuses or avoided
by candidates, as well as the failure of legislators and
legislative policy to respond to the articulated in-
terests of those groups. In cases where direct evi-
dence was not available, courts would look for fac-
tors that are likely to produce such failures of inter-
actions. Such factors would include discriminatory
attitudes and present effects of past discrimination
which.., often makes participants of one race re-
luctant to engage with participants of another.
27
Under such a broad approach, "nothing but raw intu-
ition" would be necessary to determine whether a Sec-
tion two violation had occurred.2
8
3. Conclusion
The VRA represents Congress' view of how best to
fulfill the promise of the Fifteenth Amendment. The
plain language of the statute mandates strong measures
224 See Fauntroy, supra note 26. Fauntroy argues that church
meetings play a pivotal role in elections and the mobilization
of black voters. Id. Church meetings are regular, reliable gath-
erings. Id. The teachings of the church lend themselves to le-
gitimate outrage with conditions of injustice and social wrongs
Id. As a result, church meetings are an excellent forum for
mobilizing large numbers of voters for action on matters of
public policy. Id.
Zs See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting And The Politi-
cal Process: The Transformation Of Voting Rights Jurisprudence,
90 MIcH. L. REv. 1833,1875-1881 (1992) (criticizingAbrams'
scholarship).
26 See Abrams, supra note 106, at 459-60 (admitting that
official legislative history does not support thesis, but that leg-
islators "appear to have relied upon" testimony from advocates
of increased minority participation when amending VRA).
221 Id. at 493.
designed to achieve the full inclusion of minority voters
in the American political system. Broadly understood,
the VRA offers minority voters a "right" of political in-
clusion and punishes practices that interfere with mi-
nority citizens' participation in the political process.
While modem courts appear reluctant to act on the broad
implications of Section 2 of the VRA, voting rights schol-
ars assert that the command of the VRA has not been
inet. So long as practices exist which prevent minority
citizens from participating fully in all stages of the po-
litical process, fair and equal treatment of minority citi-
zens by those who govern will remain an unfulfilled
promise.
PART III: THE RIGHT TO VOTE: CIVIC VALUES
A. Individual Versus Group Values
The expansion of the right to vote beyond "mere
balloting" represents a critical shift in the Court's con-
ceptual framework for voting rights. In particular, when
the Court recognized that voting serves a greater range
of values than "marking a piece of paper," the Court also
recognized that, even under circumstances where bal-
loting is secure, the interests protected by the right to
vote can still be impaired.229 On its most basic level, the
Court's expansion of the right to vote represents a con-
ceptual shift away from an individual-oriented doctrine,
towards a group-oriented doctrine.20 Rather than think-
ing of voting as an act particular to the individual, the
Court began to recognize that voting also implicates
group interests, such as voting strength and the ability
to influence government policymaking?'n The scholar-
ship of Pamela Karlan identifies three values, including
both group-oriented and individual-oriented values,
underlying the Court's conception of the right to vote.
m Gingles v. Edmonson, 590 F. Supp. 345,381 (E.D.N.C.
1984), cited in Abrams, supra note 106, at 466.
m See supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text.
21
0 See Pamela S. Karlan, The Right To Vote: Some Pessimism
About Formalism, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1705 (1993) (arguing that
Court's voting rights jurisprudence implicitly recognizes non-
individual values of voting); Karlan, supra note 198, at 178-83
(describing emergence of "civic inclusion" as value in voting
rights jurisprudence).
' Karlan, supra note 230, at 1707-8; see also Note, United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey And The Need To Recognize Ag-
gregate Voting Rights, 87 YALE W. 571,571-72 (1978) (arguing
that right to vote was traditionally defined in individual terms,
but that narrow definition of right to vote proved inadequate,
and that as courts sought to remedy persistent problems they
found themselves impelled to protect group aspects of voting
as well).
1. The Values Of Participation, Aggregation,
And Governance
Pamela Karlan argues that the Supreme Court's vot-
ing rights cases implicitly reflect three interrelated con-
ceptions of voting. 212 First, the right to vote involves "par-
ticipation": the right to cast a ballot that is counted.2
3
The interest in participation is the most individual-ori-
ented aspect of voting, and is implicated by restrictions
on a person's ability to cast a vote, such as poll taxes,
literacy tests, and residency requirements.?
4
Second, voting involves "aggregation," or the ability
to combine individual voter preferences to reach some
collective decision, such as the selection of a represen-
tative.?5 Unlike the "anonymous" value of participation,
aggregation is interest-oriented: it rests upon the theory
that voters should have a fair opportunity to elect a pre-
ferred representative, and it is undermined when the
interests of a group of voters have been unfairly ig-
nored. 2 6 For example, a group of voters that has dis-
tinct electoral preferences might claim that the group's
voting strength is unfairly diluted by a districting plan
that fractures the group among several districts?237 Simi-
larly, a group of voters that has distinct preferences might
claim that winner-take-all elections unfairly impair the
group's ability to elect a candidate who will represent
those interests because majority interests submerge the
interests of minority groups.?81
Finally, voting serves as an integral part of "gover-
nance," the practice of decisionmaking through repre-
sentatives.? 9 Voting is more than a declaratory event -
the expressive act of pulling a lever on election day.
240
Voting also serves as part of an ongoing conversation
between the voters and their government.241 Thus, in
addition to being concerned with who represents the
district (aggregation interest), voters are also concerned
with how effective that representative will be as a cham-
pion of the group's interests (governance interest).2 42
Election results powerfully influence how and to whom
city contracts are awarded, on whose property the county












42Id. at 1718. For example, the Court has overturned
electoral systems that systematically biased the overall legisla-
tive composition in favor of identifiable groups (white, rural
voters). Id. (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
243 Davidson, supra note 114, at 24.
244 Karlan, supra note 230, at 1716.
airport will be built, how high the tax rate will be, who
is added to the city payroll, in whose neighborhood the
waste treatment plant will be located, or how aggres-
sively environmental regulations will be enforced.213 In
short, while it is important to have a committed advo-
cate in the councils of government, it is equally impor-
tant that the electoral process preserve the ability to in-
fluence government, generally. 44 Without such influence,
voters will be unable to participate equally in the allo-
cation of government resources.2 45
2. Modern Voting Rights Jurisprudence:
Submerging Civic Values
All three of the values identified by Pamela Karlan
are implicitly recognized in early Supreme Court
voting rights jurisprudence.246 For example, the Court
in Terry v. Adams,2 47 Smith v. Allwright,2 4 and
Gomillion v. Lightfoot249 advanced a view of the po-
litical process that consisted not merely of an elec-
tion (marking a ballot) but of a series of interrelated
stages, any one of which could affect the quality of
black citizens' votes.2" In addition, the Court implic-
itly recognized governance claims when it alluded to
municipal benefits25 ' and control over community
affairs. 2
52
Similarly, the dispute between Justices Thomas
and Stevens in Holder v. Hall 5 3 is, in. essence, a de-
bate over "participation" and "aggregation." Justice
Thomas believes that the Fifteenth Amendment pro-
tects no more than the individual's symbolic right to
"participate" in a balloting ritual.?4 By contrast, Jus-
tice Stevens believes that the Fifteenth Amendment
protects a greater range of values,255 and, presumably,
Stevens would be more receptive to arguments that
a Rollins-type scheme abridges the Fifteenth
Amendment's right to an effective vote.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's implicit rec-
ognition that voting serves group-oriented values, the
modem Supreme Court tends to discuss voting rights in
24s See Davidson, supra note 114, at 23 (arguing that vot-
ers' ability to influence government decisionmaing is crucial
to ensuring fair allocation of"substantial benefits that govern-
ment bestows on its citizens").
246Karlan, supra note 230, at 1708-1719.
247345 U.S. 461 (1953).
248321 U.S. 649 (1944).
249364 U.S. 339 (1960).
2so See Abrams, supra note 106, at 472 (describing view of
political process advanced by Allwright Court).
2s1 See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
252See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
114 S.Ct. 2581 (1994). See supra notes 154-160 and
accompanying text.
24 See supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text.
.SSee supra notes 158-160and accompanying text.
unduly individual-oriented terms and thus has failed to
elevate group-oriented interests to the level of doctrine.256
The result is doctrinal confusion in voting rights juris-
prudence. For example, Pamela Karlan asserts that much
of federal voting rights law - both judicial and legisla-
tive - is superficially structured in an individual-ori-
ented manner, and yet the purpose underlying these laws
is to preserve the non-individual components of voting.
257
Federal laws regulating vote "trafficking" s provide the
best illustration of the idea that federal law in fact serves
non-individual interests.2s9
3. Vote TraffickingAnd Federal Law
According to Pamela Karlan, federal anti-trafficking
laws have, as their primary purpose, the goal of protect-
ing voters from economic influence and coercion.2 60
Shielding voters serves two functions: first, it prevents
those voters most susceptible to short-term, economic
influence from vulnerability 261 second, and more gen-
erally, it preserves voter autonomy, thereby ensuring that
the vote cast on election day truly represents the voter's
political or ideological views.262 Contrasted against these
individual-oriented goals, however, federal anti-traffick-
ing laws appear ill-structured to meet their protective
purpose.
First, federal anti-trafficking laws prohibit person-
to-person vote buying schemes,263 but do not prohibit
many other forms of vote trafficking which exert an
analogous influence on voters' allegiances. 264 For ex-
ample, politicians are not allowed to bribe individual
voters to vote for them, but politicians are permitted to
promise economic benefits to voters, generally, during
campaign speeches.2 6 These promises, if delivered, re-
semble completed bribes 66 and arguably have an equal
impact upon voter behavior; the politician promises an
economic benefit to the voter in exchange for a vote,
and thus the voter has been functionally "bought" with
public funds.267 If federal law were truly concerned with
mSee Note, supra note 231, at 575 (observing that group-
oriented analysis of voting rights is implicit in Supreme Court
cases but has not ripened into doctrine); Karlan, supra note
230, at 1719 (arguing that Court's failure to explicitly recog-
nize group-oriented function of voting has led to doctrinal
confusion in voting rights jurisprudence). Cf Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52,62 (1964) (Douglas, J. dissenting) ("I
had assumed that since Brown v. Board of Education ... no
State may segregate people by race in the public areas. The
design of voting districts involves one important public area
- as important as schools, parks, and courtrooms.").
2 7 Karlan, supra note 230, at 1707.
I8 Karlan defines vote trafficking as"transacting with other
individuals to buy or sell votes." Karlan, supra note 9, at 1457.
2 9Id.
26 Id.
261 Id. at 1495.
In Id. at 1458.
shielding voters from coercion and influence, Pamela
Karlan asserts, federal law could be better structured to
achieve this end.268
Second, federal anti-trafficking laws also have the
effect of decreasing, rather than increasing, voter au-
tonomy.20 For example, anti-intimidation laws expand
voter autonomy by prohibiting the use of superior eco-
nomic or social force to influence voter choice.270 By
contrast, anti-trafficking laws restrict the options avail-
able to voters and treat voting as a "market inalienable."2 '
If legislators were truly concerned with preventing vot-
ers from allowing their votes to be cheaply bought for
short-term benefit, Karlan argues, then legislators might
better structure federal law. For example, legislators
might pay economically vulnerable voters to vote.272 Such
an alternative interferes less with the voters' right to
decide what to do with their ballots and increases voter
turnout.
2 3
Having identified these inconsistencies in federal
anti-trafficking laws, Karlan proposes that the real pur-
pose motivating federal anti-trafficking laws is to pro-
tect the integrity of the political process, a public func-
tion.274 More precisely, to the extent that political plu-
ralism is predicated upon the theory that voters will
pursue their individual good through the political pro-
cess,27 and to the extent that the summation of these
individual pursuits will further the collective welfare,
2 6
vote trafficking corrupts this process by distorting indi-
vidual preferences away from what would be "honestly"
expressed by citizens considering the public good rather
than just their immediate economic welfare.277 In short,
person-to-person, "retail level" vote trafficking is out-
lawed because it impedes the aggregating function of
voting, and also because it threatens the voters' ability
to take part in the post-election governance by the
elected official.
By contrast, "wholesale level" vote trafficking does
not impede either of these interests, and may even pro-
mote public purposes.278 Because wholesale vote traf-
2631d. at 1456.
2r4 d. at 1459.
265Id. Campaign promises and bribery are both forms of
vote trafficking, the primary distinction being that one occurs
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27 7/d. at 1467.
27Sid. at 1467-70.
ficking involves promises which are made publicly, they
pose less danger of corruption and covert dealmaking.2 79
Voters are able to discuss and evaluate public promises,
a process which encourages voters to make better in-
formed choices at the polls.2w Public promises are also
subject to check from the voters because voters will hold
the politicians accountable for undelivered campaign
promises. 28' Finally, to the extent that campaign prom-
ises translate into improved public service from the gov-
ernment, these "bribes" inhere to the entire community;
the beneficiaries of the politician's promise are the pub-
lic, and not a targeted group of voters.282
In sum, federal anti-trafficking laws forbid retail level
vote trafficking more because such practices detract from
the public purposes of voting, and less because individual
voters ought to be free from economic coercion. Retail
level vote trafficking "transforms what should be a rela-
tional agreement and ongoing conversation between
elected official and citizen into a discrete contract be-
tween candidate and voter."m Finally, because vote traf-
ficking is most likely to occur among economically or
politically powerless voters, who are relatively unable
to extract and enforce more valuable commitments from
candidates, the practice is particularly threatening to the
quality of"more vulnerable" voters' representation and
ability to participate in postelection govemance.3 4
4. Conclusion
A broad, civic-minded conception of the right to
vote is critical to understanding how a Rollins-type
scheme harms minority voting interests. In particular,
the unwillingness to view a Rollins-type scheme as an
abridgment of the right to vote, or as vote "suppression,"
is in large part the product of an individualistic vocabu-
lary describing voting rights. The traditional, strong-arm
image of vote suppression seems so unlike the indirect
form of influence that a Rollins-type scheme would as-
sert against individual voters, and yet this traditional
image does not fully account for the non-individual dan-
gers that such a scheme would pose to voting interests.
A Rollins-type scheme is harmful not so much be-
cause it impedes the individual voter's ability to express
a political view or cast a vote, but because its primary
purpose is to keep a group of voters with identifiable
interests from voting. To the extent that elections serve
to aggregate votes and register the strength of political
beliefs, a Rollins-type scheme therefore frustrates the
interest held by a community of voters in the aggregate
value of the community's votes.
Even more troubling is the fact that such a scheme,





vote from black voters. Unlike a typical vote trafficking
scheme where the transaction at least implicitly recog-
nizes that the targeted group has- political power and
hence political value (which is being "channelled"), a
Rollins-type scheme would have attempted to com-
pletely shut off the "signal" from a group of black con-
stituents. Thus, to the extent that a Rollins-type scheme
deliberately seeks to achieve the non-participation of a
group of voters that have historically been excluded from
the political process,18 such a scheme frustrates the ef-
forts of that group of voters to accumulate political
strength. A Rollins-type scheme therefore impairs pre-
cisely the phenomenon within the minority voting com-
munity that is vital to guaranteeing full political partici-
pation, namely, the aggregation of minority votes and
the commitment of those votes to a candidate who rep-
resents their interests in post-election governance.
Finally, the fact that political animus may be coexten-
sive with racial animus in a Rollins-type scheme should
not be used to obscure the fact that such a scheme is race-
based. Dual motives aside, black voters are still the tar-
geted group under a Rollins-type scheme, and the injury
caused by such a scheme would still accrue to black voters
only. The fact that a Rollins-type scheme may also be the
product of bi-partisan bickering shouldnot change the
underlying issues. Voters choose their political parties and
look to those parties to advance their interests. A scheme
that targets black voters because of the voters' perceived
political alliances to the Democratic Party still operates as
a race-based attempt to impair black voters' efforts to ad-
vance and secure their political interests.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
The statements made by Ed Rollins were not sim-
ply the unfortunate statements of a politician with deeply
cynical views about what it means to win an election.
Rather, they serve as symptoms of a lingering impulse
within politics to disenfranchise black voters and im-
pede minority participation in the political process. To
that extent, the Rollins affair indicates that the prom-
ises of the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 have not been fulfilled and that the voting
rights of racial and ethnic minorities remain unprotected.
One critical factor contributing to the present gap in
federal voting rights law is the modem Supreme Court's
unduly individual-oriented vocabulary for describing
voting rights injuries. Voting furthers both group and
individual interests, and voting rights jurisprudence
would be better served by an analytic framework which
recognizes the group-oriented components of voting.
Id. at 1470.
2MId.
785Md. at 1471.
